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Introduction 
Existing models of information transmission emphasize the role that structural factors play in the 
network-mediated spread of ideas
1. For example, the density of a communication network may be 
emphasized as a critical factor in determining the rate at whic h an idea spreads througho ut a 
particular community. While such structural factors are no doubt important, it is also important to 
consider the role of psychological and cognitive factors in shaping the profile of idea propagation. A 
consideration of the psycho-cognitive context in which idea transmission takes place may serve to 
enhance the explanatory and predictive accuracy of existing models
2, and it may also contribute to 
improvements in their ecological validity. 
The central thesis of this  paper  is  that pre-existing, culturally-entrenched beliefs, concepts  and 
values (which we collectively refer to as  ‘ideas’) play an important role in the dynamics of idea 
propagation. They do this by determining the relative ‘cognitive advantage’ of particular ideas. The 
cognitive  advantage  of  an  idea  is,  in  broad  terms,  the  acceptability  of  an  idea  to  a  particular 
(culturally-circumscribed) community. It determines the tendency of ideas to become established in 
a  community,  as  well  as  the  rate  at  which  those  ideas  are  transmitted  from  one  individual  to 
another.  
Understanding the cognitive advantage of a new idea requires a detailed understanding of the pre-
existing beliefs and values that are held by a particular community. For just as the success of a new 
species  in  a  particular  ecological  niche  is  determined  by  an  existing  nexus  of  inter-species 
relationships, so the acceptability of a new idea is determined by an existing nexus of beliefs and 
values that characterize (and indeed define) culturally-circumscribed communities. In order to better 
understand  the  cognitive  advantage  of  new  ideas,  we  must  therefore  develop  a  better 
understanding of the ‘cognitive niche’ into which new ideas are to be introduced. Cultural Network 
Analysis (CNA) (Sieck, 2010; Sieck & Rasmussen, 2007; Sieck et al., 2010) is a technique that enables 
us to analyze and represent the idea networks of specific cultural groups, and it therefore provides 
one means by which the cognitive advantage of new ideas can be assessed. When combined with 
conventional approaches to modelling information flow and influence in social networks, the notion 
of cognitive advantage allows us to better account for the specific profile of idea propagation within 
                                                           
1 The term ‘idea’ in this paper is used as a catch-all term for concepts, beliefs, and values.  
2  In particular, a focus on the pre -existing beliefs of particular communities may  enable us to better 
understand and account for the differential rate of spread of ideas within those communities. In addition, once 
we come to understand the belief systems of cultural groups, we may be in a better position to deliberately 
influence the rate of idea propagation within those groups (e.g. by presenting those ideas i n ways that align 




target communities. It essentially provides an important step towards the development of more 
ecologically-realistic models of group-level cognitive dynamics.  
The aim of the current paper is to review the literature on idea propagation in social networks, and 
to introduce the notion of cognitive advantage. Since the literature on idea propagation is large and 
somewhat unwieldy, our review will be necessarily limited. In fact, we focus on three types of 
models  that  have  been  developed  to  account  for  idea  propagation.  These  include  diffusion  of 
innovations  models,  cultural  transmission  models  and  memetics  model.  Later  in  the  paper,  we 
present the technique of CNA and show how it can be used to develop a better understanding of the 
psycho-cognitive context in which idea propagation takes place. Before that, however, we begin with 
a discussion of the likely effect of network structure on the dynamics of idea propagation in military 
coalition operations. This example is taken from our recent work in the International Technology 
Alliance
3 (ITA) research programme, which is a consortium of academic, industrial and government 
partners seeking to undertake fundamental research in the information and network sciences. 
Network  Structure  and  Cognitive  Syncretization:  A  Multi-Level  Network 
Approach to Idea Convergence in Military Coalitions 
Military coalitions are complex organizations involving individuals from multiple nation states and 
military services (i.e. air force, navy and army). Cultural differences exist between the members of a 
coalition  (e.g.  Rasmussen  et  al.,  2009),  and  this  may  present  problems  for  communication, 
cooperation  and  the  development  of  trust  between  coalition  partners.  Since  one  approach  to 
revealing  cultural  differences  is  to  investigate  the  casual  beliefs  associated  with  some  decision 
outcome (e.g. what beliefs are associated with the positive evaluation of a military plan), it often 
makes sense to represent the cultural differences between coalition partners in terms of (what we 
refer to in this paper as) idea networks (i.e. networks of causal beliefs and value judgements). A key 
focus of previous work in military coalition contexts has been to develop idea networks in order to 
identify  the  potential  barriers  to  effective  forms  of  communication  and  collaboration  between 
coalition partners. In the context of this paper, however, it is worth thinking of such networks in a 
slightly different way. In particular, we can ask how the structure and content of idea networks 
changes in response to the dynamics of information flow and influence in a variety of coalition 
communication networks
4, such as the physical communication network (the communicati on links 
that  are  established  between  specific  communication  devices )  and  the  social  communication 
network (the communication links that are established between specific  agents). Given that these 
                                                           
3 http://www.usukita.org/ 
4  Military  coalitions  have  been  described  in  terms  of  multiple  interconnected  networks  (i.e.  ‘networks  of 
networks’)  that  subtend  the  human,  technological  and  informational  domains.  The  relationships  between 
human agents, for example, may be seen as forming one kind of network (e.g. a social network), while the 
relationships  between  elements  of  the  physical  communication  infrastructure  may  be  seen  as  forming  a 
different kind of network (i.e. a physical communication network). By conceptualizing coalition organizations 
as ‘networks of networks’, we draw attention to two things. The first is that there is a subtle yet important 
inter-dependence between the various elements of the coalition environment. For example, the physical and 
social  communication networks may be expected to interact in complex, non-linear  ways throughout the 
course of coalition operations, and the challenge, in this case, is often to coordinate the structure and activity 
of these networks in ways that enhance the collective performance of the larger coalition organization. A 
second reason why the notion of ‘networks of networks’ is important is because it underscores the importance 
of network scientific approaches to representing, analysing and understanding military coalition environments. 




communication networks determine the opportunities for inter-agent communication (as well as the 
nature of the communication that takes place), we might expect that the structures of both physical 
and social communication networks would play a key role in determining the evolution of idea 
networks in response to episodes of cross-cultural interaction. For example, if we are talking about 
the propagation of ideas from one cultural group to another, then it seems likely that the structure 
of the social communication network between the two groups will influence the rate at which ideas 
are propagated, as well as the rate at which those ideas are adopted (i.e. incorporated into idea 
networks)
5.   
 
Figure 1: Network layers in a coalition environment. This figure shows the state of the coalition 
before any interaction between the coalition partners has taken place. 
To help make this potential independence between communication and idea networks a bit clearer, 
consider  Figure 1. Figure 1 shows the three kinds of networks that we have just been discussing. The 
bottom  layer  is  the  physical  communication  network,  which  consists  of  the  various  hardware 
components used to enable communication between coalition partners. In this layer, the nodes in 
the figure represent the hardware devices used to transmit and receive information, while the links 
between the nodes correspond to the physical linkages between hardware devices. The number of 
communication  channels,  the  quality  of  the  transmission  signal,  and  the  distance  over  which 
information is to be transmitted are all factors that constrain the transmission of information at this 
layer. The second layer, which is impacted by the configuration of the physical network layer, is the 
social network layer. At this layer, nodes represent people (or other intelligent agents), and the links 
                                                           
5 It is also possible, of course, that as ideas get propagated within a community, the actual structure of the 
social network itself changes. This may (perhaps) occur in cases where some individuals in a cultural group 
accept a particular idea, while others in the same cultural group reject it. The result may be a fragmentation of 
the original social network into smaller constituents. Inasmuch as this sort of process actually takes place, we 
may begin to think of individual psychological differences between individuals as the fault lines along which 
social  networks  fragment  following  their  exposure  to  new  ideas.  This  kind  of  view  sees  new  ideas  as 




between the nodes represent the channels of communication between agents. At the social network 
layer,  we  are  primarily  interested  in  aspects  of  inter-agent  communication;  for  example,  the 
frequency of communication between particular agents. The top-most layer, which is impacted by 
the configuration of both the physical and social network layers, is the layer of idea networks. This 
layer  consists  of  networks  of  inter-related  ideas  (i.e.  concepts,  beliefs,  and  values)  that  are 
distributed across the individuals in a particular population (e.g. US military service personnel). For 
this layer, the nodes correspond (broadly) to concepts, and the links correspond to the causally-
significant relationships between the concepts. Culturally-shared values, which are associated with 
concepts, are also represented in the idea networks by (e.g.) colour-coding schemes to indicate 
positive/negative valence. Figure 1 shows one possible state-of-affairs at the beginning of a military 
coalition engagement. In this case, there are two distinct idea networks, one for each coalition 
partner (e.g. one for US forces and one for UK forces), and (at least in this model) there are no 
linkages between the two idea networks
6.  
The current predominant physical transmission layer infrastructure for coalition operations (at least 
land-based ones) is a two-way radio network system. This system is limited in terms of the number 
of available communication channels, the quality of the transmission signal, and the distance over 
which the radios can be used. Networked systems of computers are currently used by both the US 
and UK armed forces, but the predominant means of com munication during actual operations is 
through radios. The anticipation of both the US and UK armed forces is that networked computer 
systems will largely replace these radios in the future. There is a particular interest here in the power 
and flexibility  of mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs). Simply put, a MANET is a self -configuring 
computer network containing properties that allow network nodes to be completely inter-operable
7. 
If this system is implemented at the physical network layer, it is anticipated t hat there will be a 
significant effect on both the social and idea network layers (see  Figure 2). For the social network 
layer, the hierarchical structure that is ubiq uitous in many military systems will be replaced by a 
system  in  which  individual  nodes  are  connected  by  fewer  and  fewer  intermedia te  links. 
Theoretically,  anyone  will  be  able  to  initiate  communication  with  anyone  else  via   direct 
communication links, and, as a result, the rate of information transmission across the entire coalition 
will be increased. It is generally assumed that the shorter dist ance between nodes in the physical 
communication network (and the resulting capability for direct contact at the social network layer) 
will facilitate the sharing of informa tion between coalition partners, and o ne possible outcome of 
this state-of-affairs is that a single network of ideas will  emerge that is widely shared among all 
coalition members (see Figure 2). What we may see, therefore, following the introduction of new 
                                                           
6 As in many empirical network models, different idea networks do not have to be exclusive; two or more idea 
networks can share common elements (i.e. concepts, beliefs and values). 
7 This emphasis on inter-operability at the level of the physical communication network parallels, to some 
extent, the emphasis on inter -operability at the level of idea networks. The general idea is that differences 
between idea networks are just as much the potential barriers t o effective communication as are the 
technological incompatibilities between different network devices (e.g. devices using different networking 
protocols). The solution in the case of the physical communication layer is to develop smarter, more 
compatible  and self-configuring networking solutions. The solution in the case of culturally -distinct idea 
networks, however, is somewhat less clear cut. Ideally, what is required is some way of making coalition 
partners more aware of the cultural differences that ex ist between them and more capable of adaptively 
configuring  themselves  so  as  to  optimize  communication  in  different  collaborative  contexts.  Perhaps 
analogues of some of the solutions discovered for military coalition MANETS can be developed within the 




types of coalition communication network infrastructure is a greater rate of convergence in the idea 
networks  associated  with  culturally-distinct  coalition  partners.  Inasmuch  as  such  convergence 
obviates, or at least attenuates, the difficulties associated with communication, interoperability, 
trust and collaboration between coalition partners, then the introduction of new, more efficient 
communication networks seems to have much to commend it
8.  
 
Figure 2: Network layers in a coalition environment. This is the state of the three networks after the 
coalition has been in operation for some time. As is shown in the figure, a single hybrid idea network 
has developed based on the interactions made possible by the structure of both the physical and social 
communication networks. 
The general idea, then, is that initial cultural differences, as manifest in the differences between the 
idea  networks  of  coalition  partners,  will,  over  time,  come  to  be  eliminated  by  virtue  of  the 
communicative interchanges that take place between members of the coalition. As the structure of 
the  physical  and  social  communication  network  changes  (e.g.  to  allow  more efficient modes of 
information dissemination and social interaction to take place), it leads to corresponding changes in 
the dynamics of information flow and influence between members of the coalition. Ultimately, this 
may impact on the rate at which two or more culturally-disparate groups will converge on a common 
set of beliefs, concepts and values (i.e. develop a common, hybrid idea network). This convergence 
in the content and structure of idea networks is generally assumed to be a good thing, for cultural 
differences are assumed to present problems for military coalitions in terms of the efficiency of 
inter-agent communication and the possibility for coordinated action
9. Inasmuch as this is true (and 
it may not be, of course), we should aim to countenance those types of (physical and social) 
                                                           
8  Although  the  introduction  of  highly  efficient  communication  networks  may,  at  first  sight,  seem  to  be 
advantageous, Smart et al (2010) have suggested that highly efficient modes of information dissemination may 
actually  promote  forms  of  information  sharing  that  undermine  long-term  collective  problem-solving 
performances. 
9  Cultural differences may, for example, contribute to greater incidences of miscommunication between 




communication  network  structure  that  most  quickly  lead  to  convergence  at  the  level  of  idea 
networks. 
But what factors really determine the likelihood or rate of convergence in idea networks? Should the 
focus of our analysis simply be on the structural characteristics of the networks that mediate inter-
agent communication (i.e. the structure of the physical and social networks)? Or should we instead 
concentrate our attention on the nature of the idea networks themselves (as well as perhaps the 
psycho-dynamic forces that (like chemical bonds) make these networks more or less resistant to 
various  forms  of  external  influence)?  One  might  assume  that  increments  in  the  density  of 
communication networks would lead to greater convergence at the level of idea networks, but this 
may not necessarily be the case, especially once one begins to factor in the psychological processes 
that regulate an individual’s tendency to adopt new ideas.  
One  reason  to  suspect  that  the  factors  governing  idea  convergence  may  extend  beyond  the 
structural  features  of  communication  networks  comes  from  the  work  on  inoculation  theory 
(McGuire,  1961).  Inoculation  theory  was  developed  to  account  for  the  efficacy  of  various 
interventions in producing resistance to persuasion attempts. The basic idea is that resistance could 
be developed by exposing an individual to weakened forms of a message which was intended to 
produce attitudinal change. Thus, just as a resistance to infection can be developed by exposing an 
individual to a weakened form of a particular pathogen (e.g. an attenuated vaccine), attitudinal 
inoculation  (the  development  of  cognitive  resistance  to  message-mediated  attitudinal  change) 
involves exposing an individual to weakened forms of a persuasive argument. This then triggers a 
process of counter-arguing, which then produces resistance to subsequent persuasion attempts. The 
key point, for present purposes, is simply that the resistance of an individual to attitudinal change 
can vary based on their previous exposure to particular messages and the beliefs that they may have 
developed in response to those messages. 
The notion of cognitive advantage, which is the focus of the current paper, is somewhat different to 
the notion of attitudinal inoculation. It suggests that the susceptibility of an individual to cognitive 
change is, in part, mediated by whatever pre-existing beliefs are held by  an individual
10. These 
background beliefs determine the relative advantage of new ideas in terms of their being adopted by 
a particular community. Some ideas may be ‘well aligned’ with existing beliefs and are thus easily 
assimilated; others may not be so well aligned and are thus rejected. Different ideas essentially have 
different advantages when it comes to their propagation within particular communities. In order to 
predict  to what  extent  a  particular  idea  is  likely  to  be  accepted  by  a  particular  community we 
therefore need to know more about the pre-existing beliefs, concepts and values (the cognitive 
niche, if you like) within which idea propagation takes place. The technique of CNA is a method for 
doing  exactly  this.  It  enables  us  to  develop  models  of  the  pre-existing  idea  networks  that 
characterize (and indeed define) culturally-significant groupings. The availability of such models, in 
conjunction with information about communication network structures can lead to much better 
predictions about the likely rate of adoption of ideas in specific cases (e.g. the adoption of common 
                                                           
10 A similar idea is explored by Smart et al (2010). They suggest that the potential for cognitive change (e.g. a 
change in beliefs) is determined, at least in part, by whatever pre-existing cognitive states are possessed by an 
individual. An individual with mutually reinforcing beliefs, which according to Smart et al (2010) leads to states 
of high internal cognitive consistency, is less vulnerable, they suggest, to socially-mediated forms of cognitive 




ideas relating to the evaluation of military planning products). Inasmuch as we want to encourage 
convergence at the level of idea networks, it is not enough to simply engineer better, more efficient 
communication infrastructures. In addition to this we also need to be aware of the profile of pre-
existing beliefs and values that individuals bring with them to a specific communication context. In 
the absence of this information we have no real way of knowing what the precise effect of cross-
cultural communication will be on the idea networks of culturally-distinct communities. 
Existing network-based models of information transmission and social influence can be used to study 
how changes in communication networks ultimately affect the dynamics of convergence at the level 
of idea networks. However, as we will see in the remainder of this paper, these models do not 
necessarily account for the relative cognitive advantage that some new ideas have by virtue of their 
interaction with pre-existing ideas. This shortcoming can lead to excessively optimistic predictions 
about the rate of convergence of ideas in a military coalition (and in other culturally heterogeneous 
communities), especially those that are anticipated to result from a more efficient organization of 
the physical communication infrastructure.  
Diffusion of Innovations 
Research conducted to understand the diffusion of innovations has focused on how new ideas, 
practices, and especially products (generally referred to as ‘innovations’) spread through a social 
system  (Rogers,  1995).  Diffusion  is  the  process  by  which  new  ideas,  artefacts,  or  practices  are 
communicated among members of a social system, and diffusion scholars attempt to understand the 
processes by which diffusion occurs (an example case is study of the diffusion of hybrid corn in Iowa 
by Ryan and Gross (1943)). Practitioners often seek to develop programs that support the adoption 
of innovations, particularly when adoption decisions have health implications (an example here is 
the attempt to introduce the practice of water-boiling in a Peruvian village (see Rogers, 1995)), and 
these practitioners are typically referred to as change agents. Change agents are individuals who 
attempt  to  influence  innovation  decisions  in  a  direction  deemed  desirable  by  a  specific  change 
agency. They usually seek to encourage the adoption of new innovations, but they may also attempt 
to prevent the adoption of undesirable innovations. Diffusion scholars conduct field research in 
order to understand the nature of adoption processes associated with actual innovations. These 
researchers focus on a myriad of issues such as the characteristics of early or late adopters, the 
consequences  of  innovation  adoption,  and  the  factors  that  influence  an  innovation’s  rate  of 
adoption
11. 
The example of Peruvian water-boiling mentioned above provides an exemplary case of diffusion of 
innovation research.  In this case, the change agent was   a public health worker interested in 
spreading the practice of water-boiling in a Peruvian village in an effort to reduce the incidence of 
water-borne diseases. After two years of attempting to convince 200 families to incorporate water-
boiling into their daily routines, an adoption rate of only 5% was obtained (Rogers, 1995). The reason 
for this poor rate of adoption was traced to the  pre-existing beliefs and values of the  target 
community. In particular, an existing belief among the villagers was that hot water should only be 
drunk when someone was sick and that villagers who were not ill should only drink cold water.  The 
                                                           
11 An innovation’s ‘rate of adoption’ is a central metric used in innovation diffusion research. In fact, the 
‘innovativeness’ of an innovation is defined by its rate of adoption. The rate of adoption is typically defined as 




novel practice of drinking boiled water was difficult for the villagers to accept because water boiling 
made  water  hot  (even  if  only  temporarily),  and  that  contrasted  with  their  existing  beliefs  that 
healthy individuals should only consume cold water
12. 
Diffusion researchers have found cases like this to be all too common.  In order to understand such 
outcomes Rogers (1995) described a process model of innovation -decisions that consists of f ive 
stages: 
1.  Knowledge: The decision maker becomes aware that the innovation exists and has some 
understanding of how it works.  
2.  Persuasion:  The  decision  maker  forms  a  positive  or  negative  attitude  towards  the 
innovation. 
3.  Decision: The decision maker makes a commitment to adopt or reject the innovation. 
4.  Implementation: The decision maker acts on a commitment to adopt.  
5.  Confirmation: The decision maker re-evaluates the earlier adoption decision. This can lead to 
four states depending on the earlier decision, as follows: 
a.  If adopted earlier, then continued adoption or discontinuance.  
b.  If rejected earlier, then adopted later or continued rejection. 
In terms of the notion of cognitive advantage, we can think of the pre-existing beliefs and values of a 
community as coming into play during steps 2 and 3 of this process model. The notion of cognitive 
advantage thus helps explain the factors that contribute to the formation of positive and negative 
attitudes (step 2) towards an innovation, as well the likelihood of adoption decisions actually being 
made (step 3).  
Diffusion  scholars  have  also  recognized  a  number of  factors  that  influence  innovation  adoption 
rates. These include the role that specific individuals play in terms of innovation adoption decisions 
and the features of the social network in which the new innovation (e.g. idea) is to be introduced. In 
terms of the former issue (the role that individuals play within a particular community), diffusion 
researchers have sought to classify individuals  with respect to  a number of adopter categories. 
These  categories  include  innovators,  early-adopters,  the  early  majority,  the  late  majority,  and 
laggards.  Innovators  actively  seek  new  ideas  and  are  able  to  tolerate  more  uncertainty  than 
members of the other categories. Later adopters base their decisions primarily on the evaluations of 
earlier adopters (Rogers, 1995). Rogers argues that the most innovative members in a social system 
are often seen as somewhat deviant with respect to social norms, and they may therefore lack 
credibility. As a result, innovators may only play a small role in innovation diffusion processes; large 
parts of the process may be driven by other social actors, such as opinion leaders or trend-setters. 
Opinion leaders are members of the social system who are consistently able to influence other 
individuals’ attitudes or decisions. They are widely connected within the community and are well 
                                                           
12 The Peruvian water boiling case is an interesting one because it directly highlights the fact that a community 
may be differentially resistant to the introduction of a new idea based on a community’s pre-existing beliefs, 
values and practices. In accounting for innovation adoption outcomes it seems important to consider not just 
the structural and temporal aspects of communication (e.g. the connectivity of a community or the frequency 
of communication between community members), it is also important to consider the pre-existing beliefs and 




aligned with the norms of the community. The failure of the Peruvian water-boiling innovation to 
achieve significant levels of diffusion can perhaps be attributed to the lack of support by important 
agents in the social system, such as opinion leaders. 
The structure of a social system is also expected to exert a strong influence on the rate of adoption. 
For example, scale-free social networks are fairly efficient in terms of their ability to disseminate 
information, so networks with such properties are expected to produce faster adoption rates than 
others. Although some simulation-based research has attempted to shed light on the relationship 
between aspects of network structure and innovation diffusion processes (e.g. Amblard & Deffuant, 
2004; Franks et al., 2008), there are few studies, at the present time, that describe precisely how 
network structure affects innovation diffusion, especially in the context of real-world human social 
groups. Importantly, although diffusion field researchers are sensitive to the possibility that factors 
such as cognitive processes may affect adoption, such considerations tend to be downplayed or 
ignored in the context of computer simulation studies. 
Social network factors that are thought to influence the rate of adoption of innovations include the 
following: 
  Type of Innovation-Decision. Decisions within the social system can be made in one of three 
ways: 
o  Optional innovation-decisions: Choices to adopt or reject innovations that are made 
by individuals independently of other members of the system. 
o  Collective  innovation-decisions:  Choices  that  are  made  by  consensus  among  the 
members of a system. 
o  Authority innovation-decisions: Choices that are made by relatively few individuals 
with high status and power.  
These  three  types  of  innovation-decision  can  be  conceived  as  ranging  on  a  continuum 
reflecting the amount of responsibility an adopting individual has for the innovation-decision 
(complete for optional, to none for authority). In principle, authority decisions are the fastest 
since the fewest people actually have to come to an agreement. 
  Similarity Amongst Participants. This is referred to as homophily in the diffusion and social 
network literature. Homophily is the degree to which individuals in the system (including the 
change  agent)  possess  common  attributes,  such  as  sharing  personal  and  social 
characteristics. The rate of diffusion is higher when the change agent and adopters are more 
similar, as well as when adopters within the social system are more similar to each other. 
The homophily assumption is also taken as axiomatic in many simulations of social belief 
dynamics  (Axelrod,  1997;  Dittmer,  2001;  Hegselmann  &  Krause,  2002),  and  it  has  been 
identified as important in terms of preventing so-called ‘cognitive convergence’ (Parunak, 
2009).  In  spite  of  this,  the  level  of  empirical  support  for  the  homophily  assumption  is 
somewhat weak, and further work is clearly needed. 
  Social Network Interconnectedness. This factor reflects the degree to which members of 
the system communicate with each other. It can also refer to the degree of influence that 




If an innovation is successfully diffused, then the cumulative adoption percentage over time typically 
exhibits an S-shaped function (Bass, 1969). This is taken to reflect an underlying normal distribution 
of adopters, with smaller variance producing more rapid rates of adoption (see  Figure 3). If an 
innovation is adopted but later rejected, the cumulative percentage drops. The implication of this is 
that if an innovation is ultimately rejected by the social system, the cumulative curve drops back 
towards  zero.  Examples  of  this  could  include  fads  or  manias  in  which  large  proportions  of  the 
population adopt an innovation, but later reject it once the fad has passed (e.g. bell bottoms), or 
innovations that are initially taken up by early adopters, but later fail or are out-competed in the 
marketplace (e.g. the HD-DVD format saw a high rate of initial adoption until it was dropped by 
manufacturers in favour of the Blu-ray disc format). 
 
Figure 3: Diffusion function showing the rate of adoption of innovations. The number of adopters is 
cumulative. 
The Bass Diffusion Model 
Although Rogers' (1995) model describes the mechanisms that drive the spread of innovations, it 
does not include a formal quantitative component. In 1969, inspired by Rogers and other diffusion 
theorists,  Frank  Bass  developed  a  quantitative  model  that  has  since  been  the  benchmark  for 
quantifying the rate of adoption of an innovation within a population. 
The typical representation of the Bass Diffusion model is a differential equation that describes the 
adoption rate as:  
f(t)
1 − F(t)
=  p + 
q
M
 A(t)  
(1) 
The left side of this equation is the proportion of people that adopt a particular innovation at time t. 
This proportion depends on two factors: p and q. p, known as the coefficient of innovation, is an 
aggregate variable containing all the factors that contribute to diffusion that are not impacted by the 
number  of  previous  adopters.  Such  factors  include  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  innovation  and 
advertising. On the other hand, q, the coefficient of imitation, is moderated by the proportion of 
people who  have  already  adopted the  innovation at  time  t  (M  is  the  total number of  possible 
adopters  and  A(t)  is  the  number  of  people  who  have  adopted  at  time  t).  Based  on  numerous 
empirical studies, bounds have been placed on both of these variables. The coefficient of innovation, 




Perhaps the most profound contribution of the Bass model is its focus on diffusion being a function 
of the proportion of people who have already adopted. This factor is important because the chance 
of an individual adopting an innovation goes up as more adopters are present in the population. The 
rate of growth declines, however, as the proportion of individuals yet to adopt the innovation goes 
down. 
Implications/Limitations 
The  diffusion  of  innovations  research  literature  provides  some  insight  into  the  mechanisms  of 
information  transmission  within  a  social  system.  However,  most  formal  diffusion  of  innovation 
models do not explicitly account for key factors deemed important to the process of idea change in 
social networks. This is despite the fact that such factors have been fairly well described at the 
conceptual  level.  Factors  not  expressed  in  the  Bass  Diffusion  Model,  for  example,  include  the 
content of messages and the distribution of existing beliefs in the population. Such factors are likely 
to influence the susceptibility of an individual to idea adoption. 
Memetics 
In  1976,  Richard  Dawkins  coined  the  term  ‘meme’  to  reflect  the  similarity  between  genetic 
transmission and idea transmission. The main objective was to identify a discrete unit that could be 
transmitted by way of a ‘replicator’, similar to the way in which genes themselves are transmitted. 
Although Dawkins did not expand upon the meme concept himself, he spawned a small movement 
of researchers and authors who began referring to the movement as the science of memetics (e.g. 
Susan Blackmore, Aaron Lynch, and Richard Brodie). Many of these memeticists have developed 
computational  models  to  explore  the  mechanics  behind  memetic  modes  of  transmission  (e.g. 
Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981). 
The concept of a meme roughly reflects that of an idea, but what makes it unique from a concept, 
belief, or value is that a meme is a postulated abstraction that operates according to the rules of 
memetics. These rules mirror evolutionary mechanisms in biology. Importantly, memetics places the 
focus on the message, rather than on the agent. In a sense, the agents that hold a belief are simply 
carriers  or  propagation  agents  of  that  belief.  Chain  letters  are  examples  of  memetic  artefacts, 
because once started they include the instructions (e.g. ‘copy this and send it to ten strangers’) and 
admonishments (e.g. ‘it is bad luck to break the chain’) needed to continue the propagation process; 
the originator of the letter quickly becomes irrelevant and unable to prevent further propagation, 
and the extent to which a recipient follows the instructions illustrates the fitness of the meme. Some 
mechanisms frequently referred to in the memetic literature include: 
  Phenotypes and Alleles. In memetic transmission, the ‘offspring’ of a meme vary in their 
appearance. Although the meme is being transmitted from parent to child, the child's 
appearance,  or  phenotype,  can  be  different.  A  meme  contains  a  number  of 
characteristics  called  alleles,  which  are  randomly  sampled  when  the  meme  is 
transmitted to the child. The variability in allele combinations is what causes variability 
at the phenotypic level. 
  Mutation. Similar to one of the key mechanisms in Darwinian evolution, ideas vary as 
they are transmitted from one person to another. Usually the variation is minor because 




likened  to  their  parents  when  compared  to  unrelated  memes.  Idea  mutation  often 
displays  randomness,  which  is  exactly  how  biological  mutation  operates.  Biological 
mutation is always random, but idea mutation need not necessarily be so. Mutations of 
ideas often occur for particular reasons, such as to solve problems (see Cavalli-Sforza & 
Feldman,  1981).  The  notion  of  idea  mutation  is  very  similar  to  the  concept  of  an 
innovation  in  the  diffusion  of  innovations  literature,  and,  as  was  discussed  above, 
innovations are often purposively brought about by change agents who have specific 
goals in mind. 
  Selection. Some ideas are more likely to survive than others. The survival of an idea is 
based on how ‘fit’ it is. In computational memetics models, a meme's fitness function 
generally  refers  to  the  likelihood  of  its  offspring  surviving  long  enough  for  them  to 
produce  their  own  offspring,  compared  to  the  offspring  of  other  memes.  So,  as  in 
biological evolution, a fit idea is one that contains particular characteristics that promote 
the reproduction of its offspring. 
  Lamarckian Properties. Unlike genes in biological evolution, a meme can be modified or 
possibly activated or deactivated within a generation. That is, human meme carriers can 
adapt their ideas to deal with new information (Gabora, 1995). 
  Drift.  If  multiple  finite-size  populations  exist  that  begin  with  the  same  set  of  initial 
conditions  and  operate  according  to  the  same  mechanisms  (including  the  same 
constraints driving selection), completely different sets of ideas can emerge between 
the populations. This notion of drift occurs because of sampling error when a parent 
meme produces offspring (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981). As noted above, a random 
sample of alleles are taken from the parent to create the child meme. The result of this 
sampling  error  is  that  the  drift  phenomenon  is  much  stronger  in  populations  with 
smaller numbers of constituents. 
Unlike genetics models, memetics models focus on both horizontal (intra-generational) and vertical 
(inter-generational)  forms  of  transmission.  Vertical  transmission  does  not  imply  that  ideas  are 
necessarily ‘in the genes’ or that most ideas are likely to be transmitted from parents to offspring via 
social mechanisms. However, there is some importance attached to modelling the perpetuation of 
ideas over generations. In many cultures, the family unit is more influential than potential influences 
from outside  the  family, and  the  impact of  a  parent's  idea  set on  a  child's  may  be  significant. 
Furthermore, particular types of ideas (e.g. myths, folklore, and stories) are likely to be transmitted 
vertically, and these ideas often perpetuate important cultural beliefs and values that significantly 
contribute to behaviour. 
The primary mechanism for memetic transmission is imitation (Blackmore, 1999); however, other 
mechanisms have been recognized by memeticists, including social learning and instruction (Heyes, 
1993). Gabora (1995) incorporated cognitive mechanisms that resemble schema development and 
mental  simulation  into  an  agent-based  memetic  model.  The  schema  mechanism  is  developed 
through the recognition of repetition of ideas in the world. Once a schema is formed, the agent 
adapts  (mutates)  incoming  ideas  to  be  consistent  with  the  schema.  The  mental  simulation 




Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman Model 
In 1981, Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman published a detailed account of a model of idea transmission 
that incorporated evolutionary mechanisms. The primary driver for transmission of an idea within a 
generation was an n-state probability table based on the following function:  
𝑝 =  1 −  1 − 𝑔 𝑛? ?  (2) 
where p is the probability that an individual's belief state will be transformed (i.e. imitate another's) 
after n contacts. g is the probability of transformation at each contact, and ut is the proportion of 
people the individual can come in contact with who have already achieved the target belief state. As 
in the Bass Diffusion Model, the rate of transformation depends on the number of constituents who 
have already transformed (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman's transmission function. This is the form of the function when 
the probability of transmission for each interaction is 0.1 and the proportion of individuals who 
already hold an idea is 0.1. 
Like the aforementioned function that drives transmission, a simple function can also drive selection. 
The proportion of beliefs that survive selection for a single generation is:  
?′? = 




where ut is the proportion of beliefs before selection, and s is a degree of fitness. Therefore, as s 
increases, the belief is more likely to survive. 
Combining both of these functions (as well as more sophisticated approaches to selection), Cavalli-
Sforza  and  Feldman  demonstrated  how  the  ‘life’  and  ‘death’  of  ideas  can  be  likened  to  an 
evolutionary selection process. 
Implications/Limitations 
The  memetic  approach  to  information  transmission  is  very  reliant  on  the  genetic/evolutionary 










































and idea transmission. However, over-reliance on the metaphor has caused some important aspects 
of information transmission to be ignored. 
An important implication of the memetic approach is that the likelihood of an idea's survival, thus 
transmission, is heavily dependent on the characteristics of the idea itself. As Lynch (1996) points 
out, certain ideas contain features that affect the degree to which they propagate. For example, 
certain ideas contain the attribute of ‘proselytism’. That is, part of the idea itself is to spread the 
idea. Also, some ideas may contain attributes that preserve the state of the idea (i.e. prevent it from 
mutating)  or  prevent  the  possibility  of  idea  rejection,  such  as  the  idea  that  one  should  'never 
question the Bible'. Lynch also suggests that some ideas have a ‘cognitive advantage’ if they appear 
to be well-founded to people who are exposed to them. However, although this factor is mentioned, 
it  has  (to  our  knowledge)  never  really  been  developed  as  an  explicit  modelling  parameter  in 
memetics-based models. Something similar to the notion of cognitive advantage is found in the 
diffusion of innovations literature. For example, Rogers’ (1995) innovation-decision process model 
includes a ‘persuasion’ component to describe the formation of a positive attitude towards a new 
idea (or other innovation). The general issue of cognitive advantage is thus appreciated as important 
at the conceptual level; however, no precise way of independently measuring and modelling the 
cognitive  advantage  of  an  idea  is  currently  offered  by  either  memetics  or  innovation  diffusion 
theorists. 
Cultural Transmission 
A further class of models has recently emerged, which are largely independent of both the memetics 
and diffusion of innovation models. Robert Axelrod refers to these models as models of 'cultural 
transmission'. Axelrod acknowledges the complexity involved in the spread of ideas, citing such 
mechanisms as fads, extremist perspectives, drift, geographic isolation, and specialization. However, 
the model he proposes (Axelrod, 1997) is more abstract, and focuses on a general principle of 
similarity, which is believed to be ubiquitous. Rogers argues that the principle of similarity is the 
overarching mechanism in idea transmission because it is the driving principle in human interaction. 
In  other  words,  humans  would  not  even  interact  with  others  who  held  divergent  views  to 
themselves, let alone consider the views of those individuals. 
As simple as the model sounds, Axelrod produced simulations that showed how a simple rule (one 
that  would  at  first  appear  to  lead  to  complete  convergence  across  a  population)  can  produce 
multiple populations who hold completely different sets of ideas. For example, in Figure 5, each 
square represents a unit (person, village, etc) that holds a particular ‘idea set’. A unit's idea set is an 
array  of  features  with  each  feature  having  a  certain  trait  (value).  The  colour  of  each  unit  is  a 
composite representation of the unit's idea set; therefore, units with more similar sets of features 
will be more alike in terms of their colour. The top part of Figure 5 shows the initial state of the units 
in the system at system initialization (the state of each unit is randomly generated). The following 
procedure then governs the evolution of the system: 
  Select a unit at random, and then choose one of its neighbours, again at random.  
  Determine the feature similarity of the units (this is essentially the proportion of features in 




  If the units interact
13, then select one of the features of t he neighbouring unit (at random) 
and assign it to the currently selected unit. 
The results of the simulation after  system stabilization are shown in the bottom half of Figure 5. 
Here we can see one dominant region of convergence (dark area) as well as two smaller regions. 
Despite the existence of local rules that promote convergence, the model shows that polarized 
regions of ideas can, in fact, form. The explanation fo r this goes beyond the size of the geographic 
region (lattice) and the range of interactions. One factor that impacts the number of regions that 
ultimately form is the number of possible features. As the number of features increa ses, the 
likelihood of different regions forming decreases. This occurs because a higher number of features 
increases the likelihood of  neighbouring  sites containing a shared feature. Another factor that 
impacts the development of multiple regions is the number of traits/values that  each feature can 
take on. When there are fewer traits, there is  a greater likelihood that  neighbours will share a 
common feature and, therefore, interact. 
 
Figure 5: Lattice representation of Axelrod’s simulation with agents each having 5 ideas with 9 
possible traits per idea. The top panel shows a random initialization of ideas for each unit. Similar 
colors represent similar initial sets of ideas. The bottom panel shows the result of a simulation using 
Axelrod’s transmission rules. 
Axelrod interpreted these two factors as describing  a general notion of cultural complexity. For 
example, the number of features could be interpreted as a generic form of cultural diversity, with 
                                                           
13 The proportion of overlap is used to determine if the two sites interact (in the case of two units that each 
have 5 ideas with 2 ideas in common, the probability of the two units interacting is 0.4). 




the implication being that the more diverse a culture is, the more likely it is that it will contain 
elements that overlap with other cultures. 
Implications/Limitations 
Axelrod's model of idea transmission emphasizes two mechanisms, which are both suggested in the 
diffusion of innovation and other literatures. The first mechanism is similarity between agents, and it 
is the driving force in transmission of information between units in Axelrod's model. The likelihood 
of units even interacting is determined by the degree of overlap in adjacent units' ideas. A similar 
interaction dynamic has emerged in the opinion dynamics literature, where agents are prevented 
from interacting unless the opinion of two agents is within certain confidence limits (e.g. Dittmer, 
2001;  Hegselmann  &  Krause,  2002).  The  second  mechanism  relates  to  the  issue  of  network 
connectivity.  Although  Axelrod's  model  (as  it  is  presented  here)  limits  the  transmission  of 
information to units in the immediate geographic vicinity, the same principle can be applied to social 
networks in which network nodes are connected to any number of other nodes. 
A limitation of Axelrod's model concerns the characterization of an idea set. In this model, an idea 
set is an array of unrelated features in which individual elements can be changed independently of 
other elements. As discussed below, we see ideas sets as consisting of complex networks of inter-
linked ideas (i.e. idea networks), and so the assumption of independence between ideas can be seen 
as something of an oversimplification
14. 
Cultural Epidemiology 
Some scientists have noted that memetic-type approaches to information transmission have largely 
ignored much of the psychological literature (e.g. Atran et al., 2005; Sperber, 1996). The dynamics of 
persuasion, and the impact of reasoning and decision making tend not to be well addressed in 
memetic theories. Cultural epidemiology has been described as a parallel approach to memetics that 
aims to achieve greater psychological realism in its theoretical constructs and processes (Sperber, 
1996). 
Atran,  Medin,  and  Ross  (2005)  define  cultural  epidemiology  as  a  means  to  study  culture  using 
distributions  of  ideas,  beliefs  and  behaviours  in  an  ecological  context  by  focusing  on  cognitive 
processes  such  as  inference,  reasoning,  and  perception.  Cultural  epidemiology  focuses  on  the 
development of cultural models, and it can be seen as a direct extension of cognitive anthropological 
research  (e.g.  D'Andrade,  1981).  With  respect  to  model  dynamics,  Sperber  (1996)  notes  that 
individuals'  private  mental  models  become  public  in  the  form  of  shared  representations  and 
artefacts, and whether it occurs through common experience or communication, what ultimately 
develops are shared representations. That is, there are sets of ideas that exist in the heads of many 
individuals, with little variation between the heads of individuals. Similar to the notion of a replicator 
in the memetics literature, individual variants of a common idea share noticeably more properties 
with each other than with other, unrelated, ideas. Another way of looking at this is to see the ideas 
of individuals within a group as slightly different versions of a common idea that is shared by all 
                                                           
14 Something similar is suggested by Smart et al (2010). They suggest that beliefs are connected together in 
ways that reflect the logical or causal structure of the domain to which the beliefs apply. These linkages create 
dependencies between the beliefs which, in extreme cases, may make an individual relatively invulnerable to 




members of the group. For example, if Larry, Curly, and Moe are part of the same social group and 
they have all been exposed to the idea of a unicorn, then each individual's representation of the 
unicorn may be somewhat different (e.g. Larry's unicorn may be white, while Moe's may be gray; 
Moe's  unicorn  may  have  wings,  while  Larry's  and  Curly's  do  not).  Despite  these  individual 
differences, however, there is likely to be enough of an overlap in Larry, Curly and Moe’s unicorn-
related ideas to distinguish them from ideas relating to other mythological beasts (e.g. ideas about 
minotaurs). 
Sperber  (1996)  also  notes  that  there  is  often  not  a  clear  demarcation  between  individual  and 
culturally-shared  representations.  Some  representations  may  be  shared  by  only  a  handful  of 
individuals, and the degree to which there is consensus towards particular ideas in a population can 
vary greatly. For example, Mullahs possess specialized knowledge pertaining to their role within 
Islamic  cultural  groups.  This  knowledge  is  not  widely  shared  by  everyone,  but  it  would  still  be 
considered  cultural.  The  result  of  this  is  that  the  focus  of  cultural  epidemiology  is  on  the  full 
distribution of ideas in the population, not just on the most widely shared ideas (Sperber, 1996). 
The development of locally-shared idea networks among small groups within a region has also been 
found to result (at least in part) from pre-existing culturally-shared knowledge. In a study of three 
Mesoamerican  cultural  groups,  Atran,  Medin,  and  Ross  (2005)  discovered  that  different  mental 
models  of  forest  ecology  developed  as  an  interrelated  function  of  historical  context,  belief 
precedent,  and  the  makeup  of  social  networks  between  local  groups.  In  particular,  Atran  and 
colleagues  studied  folk  biological  knowledge  of  three  groups  living  in  the  lowland  rainforest  of 
Guatemala: Itza’ Maya (the original natives), Spanish-speaking immigrant Latinos, and immigrant 
Q’eqchi’ Maya. The Itza’ Maya possessed a highly-sophisticated understanding of folk biology in the 
region, and had long adopted sustainable ecological practices in the rainforest. Interestingly, the 
Latinos were closest to the Itza’ Maya in terms of folk biological knowledge, whereas the Q’eqchi’ 
Maya held the most divergent ideas (and the least sustainable practices). This latter finding appears 
to be due to the fact that the Q’eqchi’ held onto their pre-existing, culturally-shared idea network 
that had formed prior to their migration from the highlands (a distinct ecological area). The Latinos, 
on the other hand, had little in the way of pre-existing knowledge or beliefs that was remotely 
pertinent to the region; hence, they formed closer social interactions and social networks with the 
native Itza’ Mayans. As a consequence, they learned more about the local ecological niche from the 
Itza’ than did the Q’eqchi’, and they adopted practices better suited to the ecological niche of the 
rainforest. In this way, the Itza’ Mayan ideas had a cognitive advantage relative to the pre-existing 
idea networks of the Latinos. 
Cultural Network Analysis 
CNA represents a specific method for building cultural models that stems directly from  cultural 
epidemiological theory. CNA allows scientists to construct culturally-shared mental models given 
data from individual group members (Sieck et al., 2010). These ‘cultural models’ for groups and 
wider  populations  are  typically  depicted  as  a  network  representation  of  the  culturally-shared 
concepts,  causal  beliefs,  and  values  that  influence  key  decision  outcomes  (for  example,  beliefs 
associated with the positive evaluation of a military coalition plan (see Rasmussen et al., 2009)). CNA 




specific  techniques  used  to  achieve  each  step  in  the  analysis  depend  on  whether  the  cultural 
researcher is employing exploratory CNA or confirmatory CNA. 
A  primary  goal  of  exploratory  CNA  is  to  develop  an  initial  understanding  of  the  concepts  and 
characteristics that are culturally relevant within the target domain of interest. In exploratory CNA, 
concepts, causal beliefs, and values are extracted from interviews and other qualitative sources. 
Semi-structured interviews employ questions intended to elicit the antecedents and consequents of 
concept states. Questioning along these lines draws out a more comprehensive set of ideas than 
what would typically be verbalized in standard think-aloud procedures, and it is particularly effective 
at drawing out perceived causal relations. The interview-based approach can also be combined with 
‘value focused thinking’, which derives from decision analysis, to elicit values and objectives directly, 
along with the causal beliefs that link more fundamental values with the means intended to achieve 
them (Sieck, 2010; Sieck et al., 2010). Qualitative analysis and representation at this stage yields 
insights that can be captured in initial, informally-structured cultural models. 
Influence diagrams have proved useful for representing mental models, especially those that are 
relevant to key judgments and decisions (Bostrom et al., 1992), and these have also become an 
important representational format for depicting cultural models. In an influence diagram, the nodes 
are linked by arrows that represent local causal influences. That is, the value of the concept at the 
rear-end of an arrow affects the value of the concept at the arrow’s head. Fully-specified influence 
diagrams  can  also  represent  numerical  quantities,  but  the  basic  structure  is  useful  for 
communicating basic information about a cultural model. Specifically, an influence diagram provides 
a relatively simple and useful representation of a cultural model that includes key judgments and 
decisions of interest to the researcher, as well as the culture-specific concepts, values, and (causal) 
beliefs that are typically used to explain, account and justify those decisions within a particular 
population.  An  example  of  a  qualitative  cultural  model  that  was  developed  to  support  the 
identification of cultural differences between US and UK military planners is presented in Figure 6 
(the model is presented in the form of an influence diagram). 
 
Figure 6: A UK cultural model of a ‘good plan’. 
Confirmatory CNA serves to test the structure of previously developed qualitative cultural models, as 




population(s) of interest. In confirmatory CNA, specially-designed structured questionnaires are used 
to conduct ‘causal belief surveys’. The aim here is to obtain systematic data that can be subjected to 
subsequent statistical analysis. Statistical models, such as cultural consensus theory
15 and mixture 
models
16, are employed in confirmatory CNA to assess the patterns of agreement  from the causal 
belief surveys. Such statistical models are also used to derive statistics describing the distribution of 
concepts, causal beliefs, and values within the focal population(s).  
Influence diagram representations of the cultural models  can be constructed in confirmatory CNA, 
just as they can in the case  of exploratory CNA. In the case of confirmatory CNA, however, the 
influence  diagrams  illustrate the quantitative  properties  as  revealed by statistical analysis ,  in 
addition to the  qualitative structure elucidated  by  exploratory CNA.  This extended form of the  
influence diagram represents the ‘culturally correct’ concepts, values, and causal beliefs for each 
cultural group that was revealed by (e.g.) mixture modelling. Furthermore, the numerical probability 
values in the influence diagram indicate the prevalence of each idea within a particular cultural 
group. The result is a description of the full distribution of ideas, with probabilities indicating the 
consensus on any particular causal link (or node). The degree of consensus can be interpreted as the 
likelihood that a particular idea is active in a particular constituent's (i.e. individual’s) mind and of 
the prevalence of the concept, value or belief within the wider cultural group to which the individual 
belongs. 
CNA provides an integrated collection of techniques and procedures that can be usefully employed 
to build static cultural models in virtually any knowledge domain, and such models can be used in a 
wide variety of applications contexts (Sieck, 2010). For example, CNA has demonstrated its utility in 
the design of processes and systems to support multinational collaborative planning (Rasmussen et 
al.,  2009),  cultural  training  development  (Rasmussen  et  al.,  2010),  and  the  design  of  effective 
communication strategies (Sieck, 2010). As emphasized throughout this paper, CNA can also be used 
to  improve  our  predictive  and  explanatory  models  of  idea  propagation  within  particular 
communities. A primary contribution of CNA to modelling the spread of ideas is that it provides 
comprehensive representations of the culturally-shared knowledge that new ideas will interact with 
during the course of idea propagation. This is an important part of the development of predictive 
models. For just as the success of a new species in a particular ecological niche is determined by the 
existing nexus of inter-species relationships, so too the acceptability of a new idea is determined by 
the  existing  nexus of  beliefs  and values adopted  by  a  particular  community.  In  order  to  better 
                                                           
15 Cultural consensus theory is a collection of formal statistical models that has long been used within cognitive 
anthropology  to  assess  the  extent  of  agreement  in  knowledge  and  beliefs  among  a  set  of  respondents 
(Romney et al., 1986).  
16 Mixture modelling provides an alternative approach to cultural consensus theory. It permits the direct 
segmentation of cultural groups based on clusters of consensus (Mueller & Veinott, 2008; Sieck & Mueller, 
2009). Mixture models have been applied in many scientific fields, including marketing, biology, medicine, and 
astronomy. A mixture model, or ‘finite mixture model’, is given as a combination of different groups, each 
described by a distinct probability distribution. Mixture models sort through the data and group them into sets 
of relatively homogeneous cases or observations. In cultural modelling applications, the distinct segments 
resulting from the analysis represent cultural groups (i.e. groups defined by the similarity of their ideas), and 
so the technique has sometimes been referred to as ‘cultural mixture modelling’ for applications in the cultural 
domain (Mueller & Veinott, 2008). 




understand  the  cognitive  advantage  of  new  ideas,  we  must  therefore  develop  a  better 
understanding of the ‘cognitive niche’ into which new ideas are to be introduced. CNA is a technique 
that enables us to do just that. It enables us to analyze and represent the idea networks of specific 
cultural groups, and it provides one means by which the cognitive advantage of new ideas may be 
evaluated. 
Conclusion 
A key aim of this paper has been to identify approaches that enable us to better represent and 
understand the dynamics of idea propagation within particular communities. We have argued that 
one such approach involves the development of idea networks using the technique of CNA. Idea 
networks consist of the values, beliefs and concepts of individuals within a focal population, and 
they are important because they contain information that is relevant to our understanding of how 
specific  beliefs,  values  and  concepts  propagate  throughout  a  social  network.  In  particular,  idea 
networks provide information about the pre-existing culturally-entrenched beliefs, concepts and 
values that exist in a population, and these are important because they determine the cognitive 
advantage of new ideas. It is the cognitive advantage of an idea that determines the rate at which 
ideas are transmitted, as well as their tendency to become established in a particular community. 
The  notion  of  cognitive  advantage  is,  unfortunately,  absent  from  many  models  of  information 
transmission  within  the  social  network  literature.  Most  models  focus  exclusively on  the  role of 
structural issues, such as how network topology affects the rate of information dissemination. By 
appreciating  the  cognitive  advantage  of  specific  ideas,  we  may  begin  to  better  understand  the 
propagation  dynamics  of  ideas  within  specific,  real-world  communities.  Such  considerations 
hopefully take us a step closer towards the development of more ecologically-realistic models of 
group-level cognitive dynamics. 
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